

APPEAL NO. 031083  
FILED MAY 28, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 2, 2003. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on \_\_\_\_\_, and that because there was no compensable injury, the claimant did not have disability. The claimant appealed, essentially on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The question of whether the claimant sustained a compensable injury is one of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). However, as an interested party, the claimant's testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case, although the hearing officer found that the claimant had sustained a back injury of undetermined origin, the hearing officer was not persuaded that the claimant sustained an injury in the course and scope of his employment. It was the claimant's burden to prove that he was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We cannot say that the

hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden.

Disability means the inability because of a compensable injury to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to the preinjury wage. Section 401.011(16). Disability, by definition, depends upon there being a compensable injury. *Id.* Since we have found the evidence to be sufficient to support the determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the claimant cannot have disability.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**RUSS LARSEN  
860 AIRPORT FREEWAY WEST, SUITE 500  
HURST, TEXAS 75054-3286.**

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Margaret L. Turner  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Gary L. Kilgore  
Appeals Judge

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Edward Vilano  
Appeals Judge